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  Safe and Sound Banking, 20 Years Later:  




In 1986, a task force of banking academics organized and sponsored by the 
American Bankers Association convened to examine the banking industry and the 
efficacy of its regulatory system.  The group was charged with reviewing the problems of 
ensuring the safety and soundness of the banking system and evaluating a number of 
policy options to improve the efficiency, performance, and safety of the system by 
changing the structure of the deposit insurance system and the bank regulatory and 
supervisory process.  The results of the work of the task force were published by the MIT 
Press as the book, Perspectives on Safe and Sound Banking (Benston et al., 1986, the 
Report), which includes a set of principal options and recommendations. The purpose of 
this article is to assess the extent to which changes in public policy regarding depository 
institutions have been aligned with the recommendations of the Report.  We find that, 
over the past 20 years, several legislative initiatives and changes in regulations and the 
bank supervisory process have been in keeping with the specific recommendations of the 
Report or with the analytic framework underlying the recommendations.  At the same 
time, other recommendations in the Report have not been taken up and some proposals 
rejected in the Report have been put in place by legislative and regulatory initiatives.  
Overall, public policy and private sector initiatives appear to have contributed to safer 
and sounder banking and thrift sectors over the past 20 years.  Consistent with what we 
see as the main theme of the Report, a likely contributing factor is the more appropriate 
alignment of incentive for risk-taking among larger depository institutions.  
Developments affecting risk-taking by depository institutions likely include higher 
capitalizations, greater risk exposure of private sector stakeholders more generally, 
improvements in risk management, and supervision and regulation that is focused on 
overall risk.      
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In 1986, a task force of banking academics organized and sponsored by the 
American Bankers Association convened to examine the banking industry and the 
efficacy of its regulatory system.  The group was charged with reviewing the problems of 
ensuring the safety and soundness of the banking system and evaluating a number of 
policy options to improve the efficiency, performance, and safety of the system by 
changing the structure of the deposit insurance system and the bank regulatory and 
supervisory process.  The results of the work of the task force were published by the MIT 
Press as the book, Perspectives on Safe and Sound Banking (Benston et al., 1986, the 
Report), which includes a set of principal options and recommendations.  
The recommendations in the Report focus on prudential supervision and 
regulation of depository institutions—commercial banks and thrift institutions.  In putting 
forth the set of recommendations, the authors of the Report note that they explicitly were 
not addressing the political feasibility of adoption or existing legal limitations. 
The underlying premise of the Report is that, in 1986, the extant administration of 
the federal safety net—deposit insurance and the lender of last resort—provided 
incentives for risk-taking by insured depository institutions.  To address this issue, the 
Report puts forth recommendations intended to help ensure that the deposit insurance   2
system is compensated for its risk exposure, reduce the overall risk exposure of the 
deposit insurance system, and align accountabilities for the administration of deposit 
insurance and lender of last resort with those for prudential supervision and regulation.  
The timing of the Report and its emphasis on deposit insurance reform was 
propitious given the broader attention at the time being given to the moral hazard 
problems associated with mis-priced deposit insurance and the perception of de facto 100 
percent insurance coverage of bank liabilities, at least for the largest banking 
organizations.  Of particular concern in the mid-1980s was the precarious financial 
condition of many savings and loan associations, the so-called zombie thrifts.  The 
eventual need to recapitalize the federal deposit insurance funds both for thrifts and banks 
attests to the need for reform of the deposit insurance system and changes in prudential 
supervision and regulation more generally.   
The purpose of this article is to assess the extent to which changes in public 
policy regarding depository institutions have been aligned with the recommendations of 
the Report.  We find that, over the past 20 years, several legislative initiatives and 
changes in regulations and the bank supervisory process have been in keeping with the 
specific recommendations of the Report or with the analytic framework underlying the 
recommendations.  At the same time, other recommendations in the Report have not been 
taken up and some proposals rejected in the Report have been put in place by legislative 
and regulatory initiatives.  
The recommendations that constitute the main body of the Report are those 
calling for risk-related pricing of deposit insurance, changes to the deposit insurance 
contract, changes to capital requirements, reliance on current (market) value measures of 
assets and liabilities, and other measures to enhance market discipline.  The authors in 
general rejected the use of limiting activities of depository institutions or the use of limits 
on deposit interest rates.  However, they did link the expansion of banking powers to the 
ability of the insurance agencies to assess and monitor the consolidated risk of banking 
institutions.  The authors also argue that the federal insurance agencies should not be 
allowed to preempt state regulations regarding banking powers unless the new activities 
would result in uncompensated risk exposure of the insurance funds.   3
The authors recommend that the risk of depository institutions be assessed on a 
consolidated basis.  They argue that risks in a banking organization cannot be isolated by 
housing activities in nonbank subsidiaries or affiliates.     
In keeping with the link of prudential supervision and regulation with the 
provision of federal deposit insurance, the authors recommend that only insurance 
agencies be responsible for prudential supervision and regulations.  That includes 
conducting examinations and having the authority to close institutions.  The authors, 
however, would retain the traditional feature of the regulatory structure in which 
depository institutions have a choice of federal chartering agency by extending federal 
insurance authority to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.  Under their set of 
recommendations, the Federal Reserve would not have prudential supervision or 
regulatory authority since it would neither charter nor insure depository institutions.  
Moreover, Federal Reserve Discount Window emergency liquidity lending would be 
fully collateralized or guaranteed by the relevant federal deposit insurance agency.  
In addition to risk-related insurance premiums and capital standards to 
compensate for, as well as to limit, the risk exposure of the insurance funds, the authors 
recommend measures for reducing the public uncertainty about the administration of the 
insurance funds, dealing with problem institutions, and changing the treatment of 
uninsured liability holders.  They also recommend that the insurance funds be 
incorporated into the Treasury’s General Revenue Budget.    
Other aspects of the recommendations include greater use of current (market or 
fair) valuation of assets and liabilities by supervisors, by depositories for risk 
management, and in public disclosures.  They also call for focusing bank supervision 
more on uncovering fraud, which is argued to be a key source of bank failures, the use of 
information technology to enhance off-site monitoring, and the use of such monitoring to 
target institutions for closer examination.  In line with the emphasis on safety and 
soundness, the authors recommend that the federal insurance agencies not be involved in 
supervision regarding compliance with consumer protection regulations. 
One landmark legislative initiative addressing issues encompassed by the 
Report’s recommendations is the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement 
Act (FDICIA) of 1991.  The act includes several provisions resembling some of the   4
Report’s recommendations in terms of risk-related insurance premiums as well as early 
intervention and closure policies.  The act also clarified and formalized the condition 
under which emergency liquidity lending could be extended to large banking 
organizations—that is, explicit rules related to the treatment of institutions viewed as too-
big-to-fail.  The act, on the whole, is consistent with certain recommendations of the 
Report; though in the implementation of the act by the agencies, practices under Prompt 
Corrective Action still rely on book-value (not current-value) measurements, deposit 
premiums are only nominally risk-related, the Federal Reserve remains the effective 
lender of last resort, and federal agencies that are not responsible for administering 
deposit insurance are still involved in bank closures decisions. 
The first Basel Accord formally introduced risk-related capital requirements.  
Consistent with the recommendations of the Report, the Accord included the extension of 
capital requirements to off-balance sheet activities.  The Accord is vulnerable to capital 
arbitrage, which has been addressed in part by several supervisory initiatives, but its 
shortcomings still have prompted changes being proposed by Basel II.  In addition, in 
keeping with the Report’s recommendations, current valuation is used for trading books 
of banks, though not other assets and liabilities of banking organizations.  The rise in the 
use of subordinated debt by larger banking organization as part of Tier 2 regulatory 
capital is in keeping with the general recommendation for having greater reliance on 
subordinated debt.  Related recommendations in the Report such as the one requiring 
subordinated debt used for regulatory purposes to have staggered maturities were not 
adopted.  The Gramm Leach Bliley Financial Modernization Act (GLB) of 1999 directed 
the Federal Reserve and the Treasury to prepare a study to consider requiring depositories 
to issuance subordinated debt, but such requirements were not acted on by the Congress 
or the supervisory agencies.  On balance, the increased equity capitalization of banks, 
measured either on a book-value or on a market-value basis, might be the single most 
important development affecting the overall risk exposure of the deposit insurance 
system.  
In addition to the changes in capital regulation, in keeping with the Report’s 
recommendation to increase reliance on market discipline, several steps have been taken 
to improve public disclosure by financial institutions over the past 20 years, and   5
improved disclosure is encompassed in Pillar 3 of the Basel II proposal.  The agencies 
also have taken steps to improve disclosure by expanding the scope of regulatory reports, 
accelerating the release of the reports, and making the information more readily available. 
Among the recommendations relating to the agencies, the agencies have enhanced 
off-site monitoring, both through using statistical models and utilizing information 
technology to access and assess data relating to supervised institutions.  A major change 
in the process of bank supervision has been the adoption of the so-called risk-focused 
approach. This approach emphasizes monitoring and assessing risk management systems 
of depository institutions, as compared to the traditional transactions-testing approach.
1  
While not explicitly part of the Report’s recommendations, the risk-focus approach is 
consistent with the recommendation to improve detection of certain types of fraud along 
with improvement of risk management more generally. 
However, few of the Report’s recommendations regarding agency structure have 
been adopted.  Supervisory responsibility and insurance authority have not been 
combined fully.  In fact, some ground was lost from the perspective of the Report with 
the creation of OTS, stripped of insurance authority.  The Federal Reserve retains 
prudential supervision and regulation authority.  Fuller financial integration under GLB 
does include umbrella supervision, which is consistent with the recommendation that risk 
be assessed on a consolidated basis.  However, the reliance in GLB on the use of the 
holding company structure is contrary to the Report’s position on the ineffectiveness of 
corporate separateness in isolating risk in banking.  Also at odds with the 
recommendations of the Report is the raising of the nominal coverage of deposit 
insurance for retirement accounts to $250,000.  
Finally, tying prudential regulation to the deposit insurance systems highlights an 
important principal-agent problem in the financial system.  However, some developments 
affecting the banking sector, while perhaps consistent with ameliorating this agency 
problem, are probably better understood in terms of other principle-agent relationships, 
externalities, or even simply firms’ desire to assess better their risk-return trade-offs.  
Examples include the development of internal risk models by the private sector and 
improvements in public disclosures, both voluntary and in response to accounting and 
                                                           
1 Both a risk focus and transactions-based assessments are part of the current examination process.   6
regulatory guidance.  Another feature of bank supervision is the stated goal of limiting 
systemic risk.  This may have shaped the approach to supervision of large banks, the 
attention given to their role in the payment system, and the interactions among 
supervisory agencies internationally.   
Following the order of presentation of the key recommendations in the Report, the 
rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section I—deposit insurance and lender of last 
resort; Section II—market discipline; Section III—prudential supervision; Section IV—
other reform issues; and Section V—expanded banking powers.  In each section, we first 
recap the principal recommendations in the Report, followed by a discussion and analysis 
of subsequent related legislative, regulatory, and supervisory developments.  Section VI 
concludes this paper.  
 
I.  Deposit Insurance and Lender of Last Resort  
The Report highlights the reform of deposit insurance and lender-of-last-resort 
policies as an especially critical area for ensuring the safety and soundness of the U.S. 
banking system (depository institutions system).  The five areas addressed in the Report 
include: (1) modifications of deposit insurance pricing structure to remove mis-pricing; 
(2) modifications of the insurance contract; (3) changes in insolvency resolution 
mechanics; (4) elimination of uncertainties about the quality of the federal deposit 
guarantee; and (5) changes in responsibilities related to the lender-of-last-resort function. 
 
A.  Modifications of deposit insurance pricing structure  
On the modifications of deposit insurance pricing structure to remove mis-pricing, 
first and foremost, the Report recommends using risk-related charges for deposit 
insurance coverage.  The three options put forth by the Report are: (1) using risk-adjusted 
deposit insurance premiums; (2) using risk-adjusted capital standards in conjunction with 
a fixed charge for insurance; and (3) using a combination of risk-adjusted capital 
requirements and risk-adjusted deposit insurance premiums. 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 
required the FDIC to establish a risk-based assessment system.  To implement this 
requirement, the FDIC adopted a system that places institutions into risk categories based   7
on two criteria, capital levels and supervisory ratings.  The three capital groupings – well 
capitalized, adequately capitalized, and undercapitalized – are based on leverage ratios 
and risk-based capital ratios used for regulatory capital purposes.  The three supervisory 
subgroupings are generally based on an institution’s composite CAMELS rating – 
CAMELS 1 or 2, CAMELS 3, and CAMELS 4 or 5.  The three capital groupings and 
three supervisory subgroupings form a nine-cell matrix for risk-based assessments.  
However, the act prohibited the FDIC from charging well-managed and well-capitalized 
institutions deposit insurance premiums when the deposit insurance fund is at or above 
the Designated Reserve Ratio (DRR).  In 2005, only about 6 percent of the almost 8000 
commercial banks paid deposit insurance premiums. 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Reform (FDI) Act of 2005 also requires that the 
assessment system be risk-based and allows the FDIC to define risk broadly.  At the same 
time, the Reform Act grants the FDIC more discretion to price deposit insurance 
according to risk for all insured institutions by eliminating the fixed DRR of 1.25 percent.  
Specifically, the Designated Reserve Ratio for the deposit insurance fund is allowed to 
fluctuate within a range of 1.15 percent to 1.50 percent of estimated insured deposits.  As 
such, a single value DRR no longer serves as a trigger, whether for assessment rate 
determination, recapitalization of the fund, or dividends. 
The Reform Act also allows the FDIC to establish separate risk-based assessment 
systems for large and small institutions, subject to the requirement that no insured 
depository institution be barred from the lowest-risk category solely because of size. 
Regarding risk-adjusted capital standards, the 1988 Basel Capital Accord 
introduced risk-based capital requirements to address a bank’s exposure to credit risk.  
While the credit risk categories are broad and the derivation of the risk weights was not 
very scientific, it was a major step towards risk-adjusted capital standards.  The 1996 
amendment explicitly added market risk to the regulatory capital requirements.  The 
currently proposed Basel II refines the capital requirements against credit risk and further 
adds operation risk into the capital requirements. 
The original Basel Capital Accord was created to achieve some degree of 
standardization in bank capital requirements across different countries, so that 
internationally active banks competing in the global lending markets face similar capital   8
requirements.  However, the capital rules were susceptible to capital arbitrage—that is, 
strategies that reduce a bank’s regulatory capital requirements without a commensurate 
reduction in the bank’s risk exposure.  While supervisory initiatives were taken to deal 
with “loopholes” to patch Basel I, the international supervisory community has been 
working on the new Basel II requirements for a number of years.  The Basel II 
framework has three pillars to promote bank safety and soundness.  They are capital 
requirements (pillar 1), banking supervision (pillar 2), and disclosure requirements (pillar 
3).  Under Basel II’s capital requirements, U.S institutions would be required to maintain 
risk-based capital requirement using either the formulaic standardized approach or the 
advance internal-rating-based (IRB) approach.
 2   The advance IRB approach leverages 
the bank’s internal risk management system to set regulatory capital requirements.  
So, technically, the U.S. has both risk-based deposit insurance and risk-based 
capital requirements.  Under the current system, the risk-based deposit insurance 
premium is based both on the CAMELS rating and the level of book capital of an 
institution.  However, as discussed earlier, both criteria have problems and further 
reforms are currently underway.  Although it is premature to predict the outcomes of 
these reforms, it seems safe to say that the new deposit insurance pricing structure 
coming out of the FDI Reform Act and the new risk-adjusted capital standards due to 
Basel II represent improvements over the existing schemes. 
Besides risk-based pricing, the Report recommends several changes related to the 
modification of the deposit insurance pricing structure.  They include: (1) basing risk-
related deposit insurance premiums on the risk of the consolidated banking organization 
rather than the bank subsidiaries; (2) including the off-balance sheet risks of the banking 
organization in determining the risk-adjusted premium; and (3) charging insured 
institutions explicitly for examinations based on risk.   
Currently, the deposit insurance premium is assessed for the bank only and not on 
a consolidated basis, despite the proliferation of nonbanking activities conducted by a 
number of banking organizations over the past 20 years.  As will be discussed in more 
                                                           
2 In the U.S., the so-called Basel Ia standards have been proposed.  The Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and 
Office of Thrift Supervision, issued a joint advance notice of proposed rulemaking on October 20, 2005. 
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detail below, the expansion of banking power has taken place with banking organizations 
being required to house many of their nonbanking activities in separate holding company 
affiliates.  Basing the deposit insurance premium solely on the risk of the bank subsidiary 
assumes that the bank subsidiary can be isolated effectively from the rest of the 
organization.  Whether this separation is plausible or feasible, both in normal times and in 
the event of a crisis, remains a hotly debated issue.  On the assessment of the deposit 
insurance premium for a bank subsidiary, the base that is used in calculating the premium 
is the level of assessable deposits, and excludes non-deposit liabilities.  However, the rate 
schedule, which is partly based on the CAMELS rating, reflects the risk-taking of the 
entire bank subsidiary, and thus should take into consideration off-balance sheet activities 
in the bank subsidiary. 
Regarding the recommendation for risk-based charges for examinations, 
currently, examinations conducted by the Federal Reserve and the FDIC are funded 
through Federal Reserve earnings and deposit insurance premiums, respectively.  As 
such, the two federal banking agencies do not explicitly charge for bank examinations—
based on risk or any other criterion.  National banks pay an assessment to the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) for supervision, which is the major source of 
funding to the OCC.  The OCC fee schedule is tied to the number of hours of on-site 
examination, albeit not to bank risk explicitly.  Similar to the OCC, the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS) charges fees based on time spent on-site, but not risk per se.  State 
banking commissions also charge for their examinations, although the practices and the 
fee schedules vary across states.  The idea of using explicit charges for examinations 
related to bank risk can be seen as furthering the risk-based deposit insurance pricing.  To 
that end, a perfect risk-based deposit insurance program can incorporate the risk-based 
examination fees into the deposit insurance premium.   
 
B.  Modifications of insurance contract  
The Report recommends modifying the insurance contract to make market 
discipline more effective.  On changing the insurance coverage, the authors point out that 
all depositors at all banks should be treated equally, and not granted de facto differential 
coverage based on bank size.  However, they were ambivalent between keeping the de   10
jure $100,000 coverage and selectively rolling back the coverage to an amount 
significantly less than $100,000.  They did unanimously reject raising the coverage. 
The deposit insurance coverage, both in terms of the level and scope, was not 
changed since the publication of the Report until the passage of the FDI Reform Act in 
2005.  Contrary to the recommendations in the Report, the recently enacted Reform Act 
raised the retirement account insurance coverage from $100,000 to $250,000.  The FDI 
Reform Act also allows, but does not require, the FDIC to adjust the general account 
coverage levels to keep pace with inflation starting in 2010.  It remains to be seen 
whether the general account coverage levels will be raised to keep pace with inflation 
when the FDIC has the statuary authority to do so in 2010. 
The goal behind rolling back deposit insurance coverage or allowing the deposit 
insurance coverage to decline in real term is to increase market discipline by exposing 
more depositors to risk of default.  Implicit in this view is that the maximum level of 
coverage ($100,000) exceeded what was sufficient to achieve the public policy goals for 
having federal deposit insurance.
3 
The argument in favor of raising the deposit insurance coverage is that the dollar 
coverage in real term has been declining as a result of inflation; as such, raising the 
nominal coverage would help restore the deposit insurance coverage in real term.  
Implicit in this view is that the effectiveness of deposit insurance depends on the 
coverage being adjusted in real terms. 
Turning to the sources of coverage, the Report recommends the continuation of 
the reliance on the federal government to provide a basic or minimum level of insurance 
coverage, while encouraging development of private supplemental insurance.  The 
collapse of the Rhode Island Share and Deposit Indemnity Corporation in 1991 ended a 
two-decades-long cycle of failure of state-chartered deposit insurance funds, following a 
                                                           
3 Among the common rationales for having federal deposit insurance are discouraging runs by depositors 
and protecting savers with small account balances. In a public interest group framework of political 
decision making, another effect of a higher de jure limit on deposit insurance coverage might be to benefit 
smaller banking organization with limited access to money and capital markets.  The force of this 
argument, however, likely is diluted to some degree with a large number of small commercial banks having 
access to Federal Home Loan Bank advances. 
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series of failures of privately operated deposit insurance funds.  Since then, we have seen 
little momentum for expanding the private market for supplementary deposit insurance.
4 
 
C.  Changes in insolvency resolution mechanics 
The Report recommends that the responsible insurance agency be given the 
authority to close economically insolvent institutions.  At the time of the Report, the 
insurance agency had to get the chartering agency to agree to close an insolvent 
institution.  The resulting delay could involve losses that would be borne by the insurance 
funds. 
Currently, a failing depository institution is typically closed by its chartering 
authority (i.e., state banking agency for state chartered institutions, the OCC for national 
banks, or the OTS for federal savings institutions) when it becomes insolvent, is critically 
undercapitalized, is implicated in a discovery of a severe case of fraud, or is unable to 
meet deposit outflows.  FDICIA gives the FDIC the authority to close an institution that 
is considered to be critically undercapitalized (having a ratio of tangible equity to total 
assets equal to or less than 2 percent) and that does not have an adequate plan to restore 
capital to the required levels.  FDICIA also gives the FDIC authority to close an 
institution that has had a substantial dissipation of assets due to a violation of law, been 
operated in an unsafe or unsound manner, engaged in a willful violation of a cease and 
desist order, concealed records, or ceased to be insured.  These conditional powers for the 
FDIC go part way in meeting the related recommendation in the Report.
5 
To protect the insurance fund and uninsured creditors, the Report recommends 
closing a depository institution when the market-value net worth of the institution falls 
below some low, but positive, number such as 1 or 2 percent of assets.  In this regard, in 
                                                           
4 There are still private insurers of deposits (credit union shares).  In July of 2006, the Washington 
state Department of Financial Institutions invited comments on a proposal for reviving a private 
deposit insurance program. 
 
5 Under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989, if the 
federal banking agency to which the FDIC recommended specific enforcement action against any insured 
depository institution or any affiliated institution failed to take the recommended action (or acceptable 
alternative action) within 60 days, the FDIC could step in. Under certain circumstances, the FDIC could 
take immediate action. FDICIA gave the FDIC the same authority over national banks and state member 
banks.   12
the early 1990s, policymakers embraced the concept of “structured early intervention and 
resolution” (SEIR) to mandate specific intervention by the regulatory agencies on a 
timely basis.  After a number of attempts by the Congress, FDICIA was signed into law.  
While FDICIA embodied the concept of SEIR with the Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) 
and least-cost resolution (LCR) provisions, the triggers for regulatory intervention are 
based on book-value capital ratios.  Relying on book-value capital ratios for prompt 
corrective action is viewed by the Report as inferior to using current valuations.  On that 
score, book-value accounting measures may be less timely than current valuations when 
promptness of the corrective action is essential.  Book values also may be subject to 
managerial manipulation such as by the discretion used in making loan loss provisions.  
On the other hand, in the absence of full market-value accounting (reporting) and given 
the fact that many banks are not publicly traded, book-value capital is the only readily 
observable measure for implementation purposes for many banking organizations. 
In resolving depository institution failures, the Report also recommends imposing 
a pro-rata “haircut” on all uninsured liabilities to enhance market discipline, and to 
impose management performance requirements to ensure that management acts in the 
interests of the insurance agency in FDIC-assisted mergers.   
The notable large bank failure since the Report was the failure of three bank 
subsidiaries of the Bank of New England Corporation in 1991.  In the Bank of New 
England failure, the three failed bank subsidiaries were acquired by the partnership 
between Fleet/Norstar and the buyout firm, Kohlberg, Kravis Roberts & Co.  All deposits 
both insured and uninsured, of the three failed bank subsidiaries were protected.  
In the wake of the Bank of New England failure, the enactment of FDICIA 
introduced specific provisions to guide the resolution of large bank failures.  Under 
FDICIA, the FDIC is prohibited from protecting uninsured depositors or creditors at a 
failed bank if it would result in an increased loss to the deposit insurance fund.  However, 
there is an exemption from this requirement for banks that regulators judge to be “too-big 
to-fail,” and where imposing losses on their depositors or creditors “would have serious 
adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability.”  But this exemption 
requires such a determination by the Secretary of the Treasury upon the written 
recommendation of two-thirds of both the FDIC Board of Directors and the Board of   13
Governors of the Federal Reserve System and after consultation with the president of the 
United States.  To date, this “too-big-to-fail” exemption has not been tested. 
 
D.  Eliminate uncertainty about quality of federal deposit guarantee 
The Report recommends that authorities publicly announce (and follow) policies 
to deal with depository institution insolvencies and coverage of insured deposits.  While 
the Report was ambivalent about merging the FSLIC fund and the FDIC fund, it 
recommended placing the insurance funds into the U.S. Treasury’s General Fund, while 
retaining separate supervisory, regulatory, and premium-setting authority among the 
agencies. 
FDICIA’s Prompt Corrective Action provisions set conditions under which early 
supervisory intervention would take place and the associated interventions.  The least-
cost resolution provisions require the FDIC to resolve bank failures using the resolution 
method that is the least costly to the deposit insurance fund.  In addition, the FDIC 
publishes its failed bank resolution procedures on its website. 
While the administration of the thrift and bank deposit insurance funds has been 
combined, the agency has maintained the BIF and SAIF separately.  Very recently, the 
FDI Reform Act provided for the merger of the BIF and the SAIF.  The merger of the 
two insurance funds should improve risk pooling.  It also eliminates the possibility of 
having two potentially different deposit insurance pricing schemes for two very similar 
sets of institutions. 
Regarding the funding of the FDIC, the agency receives no Congressional 
appropriations.  The FDIC is funded by premiums that banks and thrift institutions pay 
for deposit insurance coverage and from earnings on investments.  While the FDIC is an 
independent government agency that is self-funded, it has a line of credit from the 
Treasury and is widely perceived to be fully backed by the U.S. government. 
 
E.  Lender of Last Resort 
The Report recommends that the deposit insurance agency(s) be able to lend 
directly when necessary to institutions experiencing liquidity problems; the funds could 
be borrowed from the Federal Reserve.  It also recommends that, if the Federal Reserve   14
should provide emergency liquidity to a depository institution, it should do so at the 
initiative and with the approval of the relevant federal deposit insurance agency and with 
sound collateral backing the loan.  Finally, direct lending in emergency liquidity 
situations should be at a rate that commensurate with risk associated with the credit 
extended. 
Contrary to recommendations of the Report, the Federal Reserve remains the 
lender of last resort through its Discount Window programs.  In 2003, the Federal 
Reserve revised the programs by replacing the adjustment credit and the extended credit 
with ones for primary credit and the secondary credit, respectively.  Primary credit is 
extended only to generally sound institutions at a rate that is above the target federal 
funds rate.  Secondary credit is extended under appropriate circumstances to institutions 
not qualified for primary credit, at a rate above the primary discount rate. 
We note that the authors of the Report do not recommend eliminating the lender-
of-last-resort function, only redesigning it.  The choice of having the insurance agency(s) 
bear the risk in providing emergency liquidity is consistent with the focus on 
accountability and with assessing and pricing risk correctly.  In a broader context, there 
may be other public policy roles of the lender of last resort, such as limiting systemic 
risk.  If limiting systemic risk is a legitimate concern for policymakers, the relevant 
question to ask is: will a deposit insurance agency narrowly charged with protecting the 
insurance fund also be effective in dealing with systemic issues?  
 
II. Market Discipline 
The presence of market discipline means that a firm has private sector 
stakeholders who are at risk of financial loss from the firm’s decisions, and that the 
stakeholders can take actions to “discipline” the firm, i.e., influence its behavior.  In the 
context of the Report’s recommendations, the private sector stakeholders are 
management (including directors), shareholders, and uninsured depositors and other 
creditors.  The Report has a general recommendation for increasing reliance on market 
discipline by imposing costs on stakeholders as disincentives for taking risk.
6  More 
                                                           
6  One of the recommendations is to expand stockholder liability in the event of a failure.  Specifically, 
depository institutions should have the option of issuing shares with double liability.  We are not aware of 
institutions having done this since the publication of the Report, though there are historical precedents for   15
specific recommendations include those for greater reliance on subordinated debt.  The 
Report also recommends expanding the use of current-value measures for internal use by 
depository institutions, for deposit insurance purposes, and in public disclosures.  The 
Report argues that one of the benefits of increased market discipline is that it can 
supplement supervision and thus lower the expenses of the agencies.  A recommendation 
also calls for examination reports to be shared with bank management.
7 
 
A.  Higher Capital requirements 
A principal set of policy measures directed at increasing reliance on market 
discipline from shareholders is the collection of changes to capital regulation.  The 
regulatory agencies adopted explicit capital requirement in the early 1980s.  As discussed 
above, the next major capital requirement initiative was the first Basel Accord, adopted in 
1988 and fully effective in 1992.  In the years after the implementation of the Accord, 
several amendments were made to the risk-based capital.  The changes in part responded 
to expanded use of new financial instruments.  One example is the supervisory directive 
in 1997 on capital requirements for credit derivatives.  Also, among the notable changes 
was the application of capital requirements to the market risk of a bank’s trading book.  
This change leveraged innovations in risk management in the private sector.  Large banks 
and other financial institutions had developed models that encompassed their processes, 
procedures, and techniques, including statistical models for assessing portfolio risk. 
Regulators saw that these "state-of-the-art" risk-management tools provided the 
methodology for setting risk-based capital requirements.  The internal models also 
provided the makings of a framework for the Basel II capital regulation to address the 
more general shortfalls of Basel I, at least for the largest banking organizations. 
Coincidental with the increased emphasis on bank capital by the regulatory 
agencies has been the substantial turn around in book-value capitalization in the industry.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
the recommendation.  In any case, the Report’s recommendation for double liability for shareholders does 
not appear to have received serious consideration by policymakers. 
 
7 The Report also recommends that the supervisory agencies be less hesitant in applying their authority to 
remove management of a depository institution promptly in situations that pose an obvious threat to the 
deposit insurance fund. 
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The increase in book-value capital among banks has resulted in more than banking 
organizations’ just meeting the minimum capital regulation, which requires banks to hold 
total capital in the amount of at least 8 percent of risk-weighted assets with at least 4 
percent in Tier 1 capital.
8  As discussed earlier, banks are subject to Prompt Corrective 
Action (PCA) regulations under FDICIA.  Banks with total risk-based capital ratio of at 
least 10 percent and Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio of at least 6 percent are classified as 
“well-capitalized,” while banks with lower capital ratios are assigned lower capital 
categories. 
Banking organizations have incentives to be classified as “well-capitalized” since 
it carries a number of economic benefits.  These include reduced regulatory scrutiny, 
more operational freedom, and the ability to engage in permissible financial activities.  
For example, well-capitalized banks can receive expedited treatment in certain 
transactions including for some mergers and acquisitions that require regulatory approval.  
When a bank holding company applies to become a financial holding company (so that it 
can engage in securities underwriting and dealing, insurance, and merchant banking 
activities) the holding company’s depository institutions must be well-capitalized at the 
time of the application and remain well-capitalized thereafter to avoid restrictions on 
engaging in financial activities.   
It is not surprising, then, that nearly all of U.S. banks are not just adequately 
capitalized, but actually well-capitalized.  Also, having many banking organization 
maintain capital ratios well above the thresholds for being well-capitalized, could be 
consistent with binding capital standards being the main driver.  To the extent that raising 
equity capital quickly could be costly, a bank would be expected to hold a buffer of 
capital to limit the chances of falling below the well-capitalized cutoff.    
On the other hand, as discussed below, some policy measures have been aimed at 
increasing the risk exposure of uninsured depositors and other bank creditors.  To the 
extent that these stakeholders view the expected loss given bank default as having 
increased, a rise in bank capitalization would be consistent with increased market 
                                                           
8 Tier 1 capital includes common stockholder equity, qualifying noncumulative perpetual stock, limited 
amount of cumulative perpetual preferred stock, and minority interests in the equity accounts of 
consolidated subsidiaries.  Trust preferred securities also can account for part of Tier 1 capital.   17
discipline from these stakeholders.  This would be true for book-value capitalization to 
the extent that bank closure policies are based on book values.  It also would be true for 
market-value capitalization.  Indeed, along with the increase in book-value capitalization, 
there has been an even more notable increase in market-value capitalization.  Furlong and 
Kwan (2006) show that the ratio of market value equity to book-value equity has 
increased substantially since the early 1990s for BHCs, especially for the largest BHCs.  
 
B.   Increase reliance on subordinated debt 
The Report recommends increasing market discipline by raising the effective 
“capitalization” allowing for greater reliance on subordinated debt for regulatory 
purposes.  The main recommendation is for greater reliance on subordinated debt to 
increase capital and hence increase market discipline.  Related recommendations would 
require only using debt that is subordinated to deposits, exclude debt with covenants that 
might impede the ability of an insurance agency to resolve an insolvency, and require the 
maturity of the debt be staggered.
9  
Consistent with the Reports, subordinated debt is part of Tier 2 capital, which is 
included in total regulatory capital.  While the debt used for regulatory capital purposes 
can have restrictive covenants and issuance is not required to be staggered, the 
environment is more conducive to the use of such debt in meeting capital requirements.   
In fact, as part of the recapitalization of the banking industry in the early 1990s, banking 
organization as a group did increase their reliance on subordinated debt in meeting 
regulatory capital requirements.  The report by the Study Group on Subordinated Notes 
and Debentures (1999), for example, shows an increase in reliance on subordinated debt 
in the 1990s.   More recently, policymakers have allowed trust preferred securities to 
meet part of Tier I capital requirements.  While these do not have the features called for 
by the recommendations in the Report, they do involve bank holding companies issuing 
subordinated debt, albeit to special purpose entities.  
Over the past 20 years, requiring banks to issue subordinate debt has been 
considered by policymakers and a number of studies have assessed the potential 
effectiveness of such requirements as well as presented proposals for how to structure the 
                                                           
9 The Report would exclude debt with maturity of less than 30 days.   18
requirements.  The idea of requiring reliance on subordinated debt was considered by the 
FDIC in the early 1990s, but no action was taken.  More recently, GLB required the 
Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury to prepare a study regarding the use of subordinated 
debt requirements for capital regulation, but, again, no action was taken.
10 
Among the studies that have proposed some type of mandatory subordinated debt 
issuance since the publication of the Report, a common feature is a provision for regular 
issuance of subordinated debt by depository institutions.  As in the Report’s 
recommendations, one approach is to have staggered maturities of the debt.  More 
restrictive requirements would have a pre-determined schedule for issuing debt.  Evanoff 
and Wall (2000), for example, would have banks eventually be required to issue 
subordinated debt twice a year.  Having regular issuance of subordinated debt is 
supported by the findings that banks might adjust the timing of issues based on their 
financial condition (Covitz et al. (2002)) and by the findings that the information content 
of subordinate debt by banking organizations is greatest at the time of new issuance by 
banking organizations (Evanoff and Jagatani (2004)).  
 
C.  Too-big-to-fail 
Other measures that are consistent with the Report’s recommendations are argued 
to have affected market discipline by increasing the risk exposure of private stakeholders, 
including uninsured depositors and other creditors.  As noted earlier, the provisions of 
FDICIA regarding PCA had the potential of introducing not only corrective action but an 
early closure policy, and thus reducing supervisory forbearance.  As structured, this 
provision is directed mainly at raising costs for management and shareholders of 
depository institutions.  Another FDICIA provision requires the FDIC to use the least 
cost method in resolving problem banks (LCR), the principle stakeholder target being 
uninsured creditors.
11  As discussed above, the FDICIA provisions relating to a too-big-
to-fail policy—that is, the circumstances under which the agencies could extend 
                                                           
10 Section 121 of the GLB requires large bank holding companies controlling a financial subsidiary to have 
at least one issue of rated debt outstanding, though not necessarily subordinated debt. 
 
11 If the administration of an earlier closure policy were expected to result in the closure of institutions with 
positive market value, that obviously would place more expected costs on shareholders.  Indeed, to the 
extent that institutions have positive charter values (intangible assets) not reflected on their balance sheets,   19
emergency liquidity assistance to a large depository institution and the procedures for the 
agencies to follow to determine if the circumstances apply in a particular case—may also 
have increased market discipline for certain depository institutions. 
Views on the effectiveness of these particular provisions vary.  Benston and 
Kaufman (1998) for example argue that PCA had an impact, even though the potential 
effect was diluted in part by the failure of the agencies to incorporate current-value 
“tripwires.”  On the other hand, Rosengren and Peek (1997) concluded that PCA likely 
had little effect.  They argue that, had PCA been in place during the banking crisis in 
New England, it would have had little, if any, effect.  The study suggests that the PCA 
imposes an essentially nonbinding constraint on bank supervisors, doing little to reduce 
supervisory forbearance. 
It does appear that implementation of LCR by the FDIC did result in larger losses 
to uninsured creditors, potentially increasing market discipline.  In this regard, research 
has found that yields on bank-related subordinated debt (as well as credit default swap 
spreads) are sensitive to the risk of the issuing organizations.  An especially pertinent 
study by Flannery and Sorescu (1996) concludes that interest rates on long-term bank 
debt tend to vary with the riskiness of an institution issuing the debt in the period 1989 to 
1991, but not earlier in the 1980s.  A subsequent study indicates that these results for the 
earlier 1980s may be related to measurement issues.  Covitz et al. (2002) find that, after 
accounting for liquidity premiums in yields on subordinated debt, banking related 
subordinated debt spreads were sensitive to organization-specific risks in the mid-1980s, 
and that the risk sensitivity of such spreads was about the same in the pre-and post-
FDICIA periods.  
In a more recent study, Flannery and Rangan (2006) look at the relation between 
market-value capitalization and asset risk among large BHCs.  They concluded that the 
evidence supports the hypothesis that regulatory innovations in the early 1990s weakened 
conjectural government guarantees, thus enhancing bank counterparties’ incentives to 
monitor and price default risk.
12 
                                                                                                                                                                             
even a book-value closure rule could impose added costs on shareholders. 
12 Flannery and Rangan (2004) find no evidence that a BHC's market capitalization increases with its asset 
volatility prior to 1994, but find a strong cross-sectional relation between capitalization and asset risk after 
1994.   20
While the impact of certain provisions of FDICIA may be debated, as discussed in 
Furlong and Williams (2006), recent research consistently shows that the pricing of 
longer-term uninsured debt issued by banking organizations reflects firm-specific risk.  
The research on whether market discipline affects risk taking is more limited and less 
definitive.  Bliss and Flannery (2001) find no evidence that market assessments of risk 
lead to changes in bank risk taking.  However, Goyal (2003) finds that covenants in debt 
contracts are a source of discipline on banking organizations.  In particular, the author 
finds that the charter value of a banking organization can affect the degree of restrictive 
covenants in its bond agreements.  The idea is that a higher charter value provides a 
check on a banking organization’s risk taking; the charter value typically is gauged by 
comparing a banking organization’s market value to its book value.  As referenced 
earlier, Flannery and Rangan (2004) also argue that, in response to market pressures, 
large bank holding companies with higher portfolio risk tend to have higher market 
equity to assets ratios after 1994.
13  
  Views on the implications of the too-big-to-fail related provisions of FDICIA 
vary and questions persist about the effect of the provisions (Stern and Feldman (2004) 
and Kaufman (2002)).  As discussed above, under FDICIA, a bank can be declared too-
big-to-fail so that uninsured liability holders would be afforded some protection, only if 
not doing so would have serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial 
stability.  On the one hand, FDICIA lays out what looks to be high hurdles for finding an 
institution to be too-big-to-fail, which should work to limit the exposure of the deposit 
insurance system.  On the other hand, the act establishes an explicit policy that previously 
had been implicit.  This elimination of ambiguity over a too-big-to-fail policy could have 
increased the potential too-big-to-fail subsidy for the very largest banking organizations.  
Recent empirical evidence, however, suggests this may not be the case.
14 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
13 A number of other studies find that market assessments of the risk of a banking organization can have 
other effects, though not necessarily mitigating risk taking.  See Furlong and Williams (2006) for a 
discussion of those studies. 
14 For the very largest BHCs, Furlong and Kwan (2006) find a negative relationship of relative charter 
values to BHC assets in the period covering the later 1980s through 2003, with the magnitude of the 
negative effect increasing after the mid-1990s.  The results are consistent with a decline in the expected   21
 
  D.  Current (market, fair) valuation and disclosure 
In principle, the pricing of risk exposure posed by depository institutions to the 
deposit insurance system and to private sector stakeholders requires current (market) 
valuations of depository institutions’ assets and liabilities.  The Report recommends the 
voluntary use of market value measurement by depository institutions for internal 
purposes and the mandatory use of current-value measurements for deposit insurance 
purposes.  Regarding disclosure, the recommendations are for voluntary public 
disclosures by depository institutions of selected current-value measures, announcements 
by the (insurance) agencies of actions against depository institutions (when filed), and 
agencies’ giving examination reports directly to depository institution management 
(including directors).  
Consistent with the spirit of the recommendations, the use of current valuations 
among large banks and other financial institutions has increased over the past 20 years.  
In part, this reflects compliance with new accounting standards issued by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) over the past several years that affect the 
accounting standards and disclosures associated with financial instruments that comprise 
a large part of banking activities.  Much of the emphasis has been on the current value of 
financial instruments, asset transfers, and off-balance sheet risks.
15   
Internal use of current-value measures is part of risk management among large 
depository institutions.  Regarding the application of current-value measures by the 
banking agencies, current-value measures are part of the capital standards for market 
                                                                                                                                                                             
value of the federal “guarantee” related to the protection of creditors at the banking organizations most 
likely to be viewed as “too-big-to-fail.” 
15 Over the past several years, FASB has issued several standards related to current (fair) value accounting 
and risk exposure  affecting banks, including:  
FAS 107 : Disclosures about fair values of financial instruments 
FAS 114 : Accounting by creditors for impairment of a loan  
FAS 115 : Accounting for certain investments in debt and equity securities 
FAS 119 : Disclosures about derivatives 
FAS 125 : Accounting for transfers and servicing of financial assets and extinguishments of 
liabilities 
FAS 133: Accounting for derivative instruments and hedging activities. 
FAS 141: Accounting and reporting for business combinations (purchase accounting in mergers).   22
risks of trading books.  However, the agencies have been reluctant to adopt broader 
applications of current-value measures.
16 Also, the FDIC generally is not required to use 
current-value measures for deposit insurance purposes, as recommended in the Report.   
In place of the full application of current-value accounting in banking, the 
agencies have promoted initiatives for reporting information that can be used to assess 
risk exposures.  An example is the joint agency guidance on asset securitization, which 
deals with reporting retained risk in securitization.  The Study Group on Disclosure 
(2000) discusses the role of the banking agencies, the SEC, FASB, international banking 
agencies, and the private sector in the public disclosure of information on banking 
organizations.   
One of the recommendations of that study was to convene a private sector group 
to identify key issues in public disclosures for banking organizations and make 
recommendations for voluntary enhancement to those disclosures.  As a result, the 
Working Group on Public Disclosure was established in April 2001 by the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and it was chaired by Walter V. Shipley, 
retired chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank.
17 The report set out a list of principles for 
public disclosure and identified several specific areas for improving public disclosure by 
financial institutions.  A key principle was that disclosures should include information 
that is consistent with an institution’s approach to risk management.  It is also notable 
that the specific recommendations for enhancing public disclosures called for reporting 
information about risk exposures, rather than reporting fair-value measures per se.  
Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, voluntary private sector initiatives have played an 
important role in advancing the use of current value measures in banking.  Again, one of 
the most notable private-sector initiatives is the development and use of internal risk 
models.
18 
                                                           
16 See for example, Bies (2004). 
17 SR 01-6 (2001). 
18 The Study Group on Disclosure (2000) also recommended changes to the treatment of regulatory reports 
for banking organizations.  In recent years, bank Call Reports and bank holding company regulatory reports 
have been made available electronically and the release of reports for larger bank holding companies has 
been accelerated.   23
  The supervisory agencies are required to make public formal supervisory actions 
taken against banking organizations.  In 1989 and 1990, the U.S. Congress adopted 
legislation requiring bank regulatory agencies to make public all formal enforcement 
actions imposed on banks.  Moreover, this enhanced disclosure was adopted during a 
period of great banking distress in the United States.  By making the formal actions 
public, bank supervisors were in effect disclosing that certain institutions were believed 
to have a high probability of failure in the absence of substantial remedial action.  In their 
examination of the impact of disclosing formal actions, Jordan, Peek, and Rosengren 
(1999) find that disclosures provide information to the market about the individual 
institutions.  
 
  E.  Use of Market information in bank supervision 
  The Report argues that enhanced market discipline could reduce the cost of 
government supervision; specifically, enhanced oversight from market participants could 
supplement bank supervision by the agencies.  Indeed, some policymakers have been 
very supportive of the idea that, with increased complexity and sophistication of large 
banking organizations, reliance on market signals (pricing of bank-related securities) can 
be an important supplement to other sources of information used in the supervisory 
process.
19 In fact, over the past several years, financial market information has been 
incorporated into the bank supervision process.  Burton and Seale (2005) discuss the use 
of market information in bank supervision by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.  
Feldman and Schmidt (2003) document the incidence of references to financial market 
information in Federal Reserve supervisory reports and identify the types of market 
information considered.  Furlong and Williams (2006) report that for the Federal Reserve 
System, while resources directed at the use of market information in the supervisory 
process remained modest, they are increasing.   
At the same time, Furlong and Williams (2006) point out that there remains 
considerable skepticism about the ability of the market to uncover with any regularity 
problems among traditional banking organizations ahead of bank supervisors.  That is 
because banking supervisors have access to confidential information and, in the case of 
                                                           
19 See Meyer (1999) and Stern (2000).        24
the very largest banking organizations, examiners are on-site fulltime.  What is 
recognized, however, is that market sentiment can influence a banking organization’s 
operations, especially its access to funding.  Using the market information along with 
other sources of information is seen as being especially useful to bank supervisors in the 
face of adverse events affecting conditions in the banking industry or of a given banking 
organization.  So, while information (related to the financial condition of banking 
institutions) from equity, debt, and derivatives markets is used in several stages of bank 
supervision and is included regularly in supervisory reports, it appears that such 




  F.  Examination reports and rating explicitly given to directors and senior 
management 
  Consistent with the recommendation in the Report, follow-ups with bank 
management are part of the bank examination process.  Senior management is provided 
with the examination reports and key finding are discussed with management.   
 
III. Prudential Supervision  
  
  A.  Examination process 
  The Report includes several recommendations for revising the bank examination 
process.  The authors argue that fraud and insider abuse are major problems and the 
examination process should focus on uncovering fraud.  The other recommendations 
include: directing examinations at verifying accounting and estimates of the current value 
of assets and liabilities; using existing data, statistical methods and computer models to 
monitor risk and to predict risk and identify problems; increasing the reporting of 
                                                           
20 The first Federal Reserve System guidance for the use of financial market information by examiners was 
in 1994, with the issuance of SR Letter 94-47.  That document directs examiners to consider equity returns 
as possible signals of condition for publicly traded financial institutions.  The guidance was later replaced 
by SR Letter 95-43. More recently, the new bank holding company rating methodology, as implemented by 
SR 04-18, requires examiners to consider market indicators in rating the Financial component of the rating 
system.   
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significant information using information technology; and charging for risk examinations 
of institutions based on time spent by the agencies.
21 
  The bank supervision and examination processes have changed over the past 20 
years and the agencies have taken advantage of advances in information technology.  A 
notable change directly affecting the examination process has been the adoption of the 
so-called risk-focus approach.  The risk-focus approach was formally announced by the 
Federal Reserve in 1997.   
  Risk-focused (risk-based) supervision has at least two key dimensions.  One is 
that examiners can scope examinations to target activities of a banking organization that 
might be most vulnerable.  Another is that examiners review an organization’s risk 
management process—the level of management’s expertise needed to oversee effectively 
an institution’s business strategy; the adequacy of internal controls for monitoring a 
bank's activity; and the presence of contingency plans to mitigate loss in a worst-case 
scenario.  This risk focus is supplemented with traditional transactions-testing of a 
sample of a banking organization’s assets. 
  While improved risk management in banking could help protect the insurance 
fund, it should be noted that the adoptions of risk-focused supervision was not motivated 
mainly by the presence of moral hazard from mis-priced deposit insurance.  Rather, the 
application of risk-focus supervision assumes that banks have an incentive to measure 
risk accurately and to manage that risk.  In fact, the risk-focus approach can be seen as 
arising out of financial institutions’ own innovations in risk management such as the 
development of risk models for use in determining the internal allocation of capital. 
  Nevertheless, the risk-focus approach, with an emphasis on controls, is consistent 
with the Report’s recommendation to enhance the detection of fraud.  In particular, it 
would seem to address instances of employee fraud, such as in the case of Barings.  There 
maybe some take-back with regard to detecting fraud with fewer resources directed at 
transactions testing in examinations.  The risk-focus approach also would seem to direct 
fewer resources toward verifying accounting and current-value measures. Even these 
potential drawbacks may be mitigated by other changes in bank supervision. 
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  One such change is the move to what might be called continuous supervision for 
larger banking organizations.  Aside from having staff on-site at the very largest banking 
organizations and off-site monitoring more generally, supervision involves a series of 
targeted examinations leading up to full examinations.  The targeted examinations can 
focus on particular areas of risk—credit risk, market risk, compliance risk, or operational 
risk.  Fraud is considered part of operational risk.  
  Another dimension of bank supervision is the movement toward differential 
approaches to overseeing large and small banking organizations.  With larger 
organizations seen as posing the greater risk to the financial system, more attention is 
given to those institutions.  Whereas for smaller banks, the Federal Reserve, for example, 
relies almost exclusively on the reports from the primary federal banking supervisor in 
determining the supervisory rating for smaller shell bank holding companies.  A shift of 
supervisory resources to focus on larger, more complex banking organizations can be 
seen as consistent with a goal of protecting the deposit insurance system.  However, it 
also is consistent with a goal of directing resources at the set of institutions most likely to 
affect systemic risk. 
  As discussed earlier, a number of changes have been made by the agencies 
relating to current-value measures and disclosures regarding risk exposures.  In addition, 
for larger banking organizations, the assessment of risk-management includes 
considerations such as the documentation and reliability of internal risk measures.  
Regarding accounting, a number of steps have been taken, including dropping regulatory 
accounting practices (RAP) and adopting generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP). 
  Off-site monitoring among the federal banking agencies has been expanded and 
improved substantially, as the agencies have taken advantage of statistical models and the 
advances in information technology.   At the Federal Reserve, for example, off-site 
monitoring models are used to estimate probabilities of failures and to predict CAMELS 
ratings.  Ongoing efforts include the development of monitoring models for holding 
companies, including ones that incorporate market-based variables.   
 
  B.  Agency Structure   27
  The Report includes arguments against potential changes to the structure of the 
agencies that would concentrate supervisory and regulatory authority.  The Report rejects 
having a single super-agency, giving the Federal Reserve added responsibility, and 
having federal agencies pre-empt state regulation (in the absence of a threat to the deposit 
insurance system).  The Report does recommend combining responsibilities for 
prudential supervision and regulation with those for administering deposit insurance, 
extending deposit insurance responsibilities to the OCC, taking the Federal Reserve out 
of prudential supervision, and having the other agencies (deposit insurers) focus only on 
prudential supervision.  
  Few of the Report’s recommendations regarding agency structure have been 
adopted.  The one item in the plus column for the Report is the rejection by the Congress 
of a single “super agency.”  With regard to bank supervision and regulation, the U.S. has 
several federal agencies that share responsibility for prudential regulation.  Not only has 
the U.S. retained the multi-banking agency structure, it also has kept much of the silo 
structure regarding financial regulation more generally.  This is in contrast to countries 
such as the U.K. that created the Financial Services Authority. 
  The lynchpin to agency restructuring among the Report’s recommendations is 
tying supervisory responsibility and insurance administration.  In making this 
recommendation, the Report’s authors still would retain the traditional feature of the U.S. 
supervisory structure in which depository institutions have a choice of chartering agency 
by extending federal insurance authority to the OCC.  The agencies, as deposit insurers, 
would not have consumer protection responsibilities and would focus only on safety and 
soundness. 
  Under the set of recommendations, the Federal Reserve would not have prudential 
supervision or regulatory authority since it would neither charter nor insure depository 
institutions.  Moreover, Federal Reserve Discount Window emergency liquidity lending 
would be fully collateralized or guaranteed by the relevant deposit insurance agency.   
  The banking agency structure in the U.S. has retained the feature where banking 
institutions have choices among federal bank supervisors.  However, no steps have been 
taken to combine more fully supervisory responsibility and insurance authority.  In fact, 
some ground was lost from the perspective of the Report with the creation of the OTS,   28
stripped of insurance authority.
22  The FDIC still has responsibilities regarding 
compliance to consumer protection laws and regulations.  Moreover, the Federal Reserve 
retains prudential supervision and regulation authority.   
  Indeed, in some ways the Congress expanded the responsibilities of the Federal 
Reserve.  GLB tends to put the expansion of activities outside the banks.
23  The act also 
gives the Federal Reserve umbrella oversight of financial holding companies.
24  On the 
other hand, GLB puts limits on the Federal Reserve.  It designates the Federal Reserve as 
the umbrella supervisor for financial holding companies, while the securities and 
insurance affiliates are subject to functional regulation by the SEC, the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission, and state insurance commissions.  For financial holding 
companies, the GLB Act directs the Federal Reserve to rely as much as possible on the 
functional regulators (including the primary federal banking supervisory agency) for 
examination and other information.  As discussed above, the provisions of FDICIA 
related to too-big-to-fail do provide guidelines on the emergency liquidity lending, but 
the Federal Reserve is still a key part of the process.  
 
IV. Other Reform Issues 
                                                           
22 FIRREA eliminated the FSLIC and created the OTS, under the Department of the Treasury, to assume 
the examination and supervision functions of the former the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). 
The act also created the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) and the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF). 
 
23 All of the new activities under GLB can be conducted in a holding company affiliate and some in a 
financial subsidiary of a bank.  At this time, general insurance underwriting and merchant banking can be 
conducted only in financial holding company (FHC) affiliates. For the other activities, banks face 
limitations on the size of financial subsidiaries.  While a number of activities, including underwriting 
municipal securities, can be done within the bank, most of the avenues for financial integration are pushed 
out to holding company affiliates or bank subsidiaries. 
24 Note also that even though there is umbrella supervision directed at consolidated risk of holding 
companies, GLB retains the concept that the bank subsidiaries can be shielded from risk transmitted from 
other subsidiaries.  Several provisions of the act point to the primacy of protecting the banks in a FHC. For 
example, the act keeps in place limits on the financial transactions between a bank and the other holding 
company affiliates. Also, if the Federal Reserve has concerns about a bank's exposure to risk from a 
functionally regulated affiliate, the Federal Reserve can interact directly with the nonbank affiliate, 
including conducting examinations.  Parallel provisions apply for financial subsidiaries of banks, including 
limits on financial transactions between the bank and its subsidiaries. In addition, a bank's outstanding 
equity investments, including retained earnings, in its financial subsidiaries are to be deducted from the 
bank's capital. To ensure transparency for the bank, published financial statements must present separate 
financial information on the bank. 
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The Report calls for the insurance agencies to monitor deposit rates and fund 
flows to safeguard against risky institutions overbidding for deposits when deposit 
insurance is not properly priced.  The supervisory agencies certainly have access to an 
institution’s retail deposit pricing schedule and any abnormal growth in deposits likely 
would trigger supervisory scrutiny.  While we are not aware of any systematic monitoring 
of retail deposit interest rates (outside of the exam process), as discussed earlier, a wide 
variety of market signals related to the financial condition of banking organizations is 
monitored regularly.  
  Another possible source of information, not mentioned in the Report, is the 
pricing of a banking organization’s loans.  Morgan and Ashcraft (2006), for example, 
advocated using loan rates to monitor bank risk taking.  Their idea is intuitively 
appealing, but the implementation may not be trivial.  Currently, the Federal Reserve 
collects loan rate data over a two-week period for a panel of banks each quarter in its 
Surveys of Bank Lending Practices.  The banking agencies also have information on 
syndicate loans.  In addition, some Federal Reserve Banks have conducted pilot projects 
to collect loan information for the major borrowers of large banking organizations. 
 
V.  Expanded Powers 
  The Report recommends that the main criteria for authorizing new activities 
should be the ability of the responsible insurance agency to monitor and to assess the 
total risk implications of the new activity for the consolidated entity as well as to price 
the risk to the consolidated entity (or to adjust capital requirements accordingly).  In the 
views of the authors, the Glass Steagall Act’s separation of commercial and investment 
banking, and the separation of banking and insurance, were neither necessary nor 
desirable for reducing conflicts of interest.  Their position regarding the concentration of 
power is that the best way to eliminate any concerns would be to promote competition 
aggressively, to ease entry and exit restrictions, and to enforce existing antitrust statutes.  
The Report rejects the idea of housing the new activities in nonbank subsidiaries or 
affiliates because it would not protect the insurance agency from the risk of new activities 
so long as the holding company can shift risk to insured bank subsidiaries.   30
  Regulatory and legislative actions over the past 20 years have allowed greater 
affiliation of banking and other financial services.  Even with the Glass-Steagall Act, in 
the period after 1986, bank holding companies were permitted to engage in securities 
underwriting and dealing on a limited basis through their so-called Section 20 
subsidiaries approved by the Federal Reserve.  On the insurance side, national banks 
exploited loopholes in the law by conducting insurance agency activities in small towns.  
Nonetheless, the corporate merger between Citicorp and Travelers Insurance in 1998 
created the urgency to re-examine banking powers. 
  In 1999, the GLB Act formally repealed provisions of the Glass Steagall Act, 
allowing banking firms to be affiliated with securities firms and insurance companies.  
However, the new securities activities and the insurance activities of the banking 
organization must be conducted outside of the bank subsidiaries in nonbank affiliates. 
  To keep regulation responsive, the GLB Act gave the Federal Reserve and the 
Treasury the authority to define new activities that are financial in nature, or incidental to 
financial activities.  Regarding banking and commerce, the act for the most part kept 
them separate (aside from allowing merchant banking activities), but left the door slightly 
open by letting the Federal Reserve determine when some nonfinancial activities are 
complementary to financial services.  However, the reality of banking organizations 
entering new activities that are financial in nature or incidental to financial activities 
could be very challenging.  In the years since the passage of the GLB Act, various 
attempts by banking companies to enter the real estate brokerage and agency activities 
have been effectively blocked.  So far, there has not been any meaningful approval of 
new financial activities.
25      
  These measures allowing greater affiliation of banking with other financial 
activities are consistent with the views in the Report that such affiliation should not lead 
to conflicts of interests that are harmful to consumers.  Even the continued restrictions on 
mixing banking and commerce could be seen as consistent with the views in the Report, 
to the extent that the ban could be motivated by concerns over the ability of the 
supervisory agencies to assess and monitor the associated risks.   
                                                           
25 The mixing of banking and commerce has been allowed through the Industrial Loan Company (ILC) 
charter.  At the time of the conference, the FDIC had placed a 6-month moratorium on approving ILC 
applications for deposit insurance.   31
  The use of the holding company framework for expanding banking powers, 
however, is clearly at odds with the views expressed in the Report.  A relevant question 
to explore is: to the extent that deposit insurance is not assessed on the risk of a 
consolidated enterprise, would it make sense, even in the context of a second best 
solution, to at least try to isolate the banking subsidiary from the rest of the organization?  
As indicated earlier, placing certain new activities of a financial holding company in 
nonbank subsidiaries per the GLB Act was an attempt to protect insured bank 
subsidiaries.  Going back to our earlier discussion of the deposit insurance reform 
proposal regarding whether the enterprise risk or just the bank risk should be used for the 
pricing of deposit insurance, perhaps a larger question relevant to this debate is the 
longstanding one over corporate separateness.  That is, can a bank subsidiary be 
effectively insulated from the rest of the organization?  What are the social benefits and 
costs of the universal banking model versus the holding company model? 
  Regarding the supervision of banking firms that engage in nonbank financial 
activities, the GLB Act designates the Federal Reserve as the umbrella supervisor of 
financial holding companies, and the functional regulators as the supervisors of the 
nonbank affiliates.  The rational for having an umbrella supervisor is that large financial 
institutions tend to manage their risk on a consolidated basis and operate along business 
lines that cut across legal entities.  At the same time, several provisions of the GLB Act 
are intended to insulate a banking organization’s depository subsidiaries from the risk of 
other affiliates.  For example, the dealings between a bank and other financial affiliates 
have to be made at arms-length and on market terms. They also are subject to quantitative 
limits and collateral requirements.  Other regulations are in place to limit the ability of a 




 The  Perspectives on Safe and Sound Banking, written 20 years ago when the 
nation’s banking and thrift sectors were in serious distress, took a broad and deep look at 
the issues contributing to the banking problems.  The Report made a number of 
recommendations to improve the efficiency, performance, and safety of the banking   32
system by changing the structure of the deposit insurance system and the bank regulatory 
and supervisory process.  The recommendations are based on economic principles, 
including the theory underlying options pricing models and agency theory in finance. 
   Certainly, today we have a much healthier banking and thrift sectors, with 
institutions registering record profits.  Compared to the 1980s and early 1990s, there 
seems to be little question that the safety and soundness of the banking system has 
improved substantially—at least for now.  Looking back, one can point to several major 
developments that have shaped the U.S. banking system during the last two decades.   
Among these are the recapitalization of the banking industry, financial market 
innovations and increased sophistication of risk management, and greater overall 
efficiency.    
These developments are consistent with and to some extent connected to public 
policy measures that are in keeping with the set of recommendations laid out in the 
Report.  We see the primary thesis of the Report as being that a safe and sound banking 
system requires that risk-taking incentives among depository institutions are 
appropriately aligned and the scope of the federal safety net is limited.  Accordingly, the 
Report highlights the moral hazard problem of fixed-premium deposit insurance as a 
major source of instability.  The other general areas of focus in the Report are the 
promotion of market discipline in banking and reform of prudential supervision and 
regulation of depository institutions.  The core recommendations in the Report directed at 
these general areas of concern include adopting risk-based deposit premiums, instituting 
risk-based capital requirements, implementing early intervention and closure policies, 
making wider use of current (market) valuations of assets and liabilities, increasing 
reliance on market discipline from uninsured creditors, and aligning agencies’ 
accountability regarding prudential regulation and protection of the deposit insurance 
funds. 
In this article, we have examined how the recommendations in the Report map to 
the myriad legislative initiatives and regulatory and supervisory developments over the 
past 20 years.  For one of the core set of recommendations, those related to the 
administration of deposit insurance, the authority and framework for risk-based deposit   33
premiums are in place.  However, as a practical matter, differential pricing of deposit 
insurance likely has had a minimal effect on incentives for risk-taking.   
We would argue that the much more ground has been gained in protecting the 
deposit insurance system through the increase in bank capitalization, both in terms of 
book-value and market-value of equity.  The increase in equity capitalization has 
coincided with greater regulatory and supervisory emphasis on higher capitalization as 
well as tying capitalization to risk.  Still, it is uncertain as to what extent the increased 
capitalization in banking can be attributed directly to capital regulation or to market 
forces.  However, having market forces play an important role in the recapitalization of 
banks is consistent with a goal of increasing reliance on market discipline.  
Indeed, it appears that the concept of promoting market discipline in banking has 
been incorporated broadly in public policy.  This is reflected in a range of initiatives from 
the provisions of FDICIA to pillar 3 of Basel II.  The agencies also have been laying 
down the infrastructure for greater reliance on market information by incorporating 
market data in banking supervision and pushing the frontiers in public disclosure.  
Among banking organizations, reliance on subordinated debt has increased since the 
early 1990s.  Moreover, the empirical evidence shows that uninsured depositors and other 
creditors are sensitive to the overall risk of individual banking organizations.  
The goal of enhancing market discipline in large part is to curtail the de facto 
scope of deposit insurance.  The provisions of GLB relating to the extension of 
emergency liquidity to larger institutions also likely reinforced the market’s views that 
some banking organization would not be eligible for such credit.  The uncertainty is over 
whether the more explicit policy on too-big-to-fail reduces the ambiguity regarding the 
treatment of the very largest banking organizations.  On that score, some empirical 
evidence suggests that, overall, the conjectural government guarantees associated with 
the federal safety net may have been reduced. 
Another key development that is in keeping with the Report is the improvement in 
risk management.  Risk management is mainly about identifying, measuring, and pricing 
risk correctly.  The issue of moral hazard from deposit insurance aside, bank shareholders 
and uninsured creditors have an interest in banks’ measuring risk accurately.  Advances 
in financial modeling and in information technology enabled the development of more   34
sophisticated risk management tools, making effective enterprise wide risk management a 
realizable goal for large financial organizations.  Interestingly, leveraging these 
developments in the private sector, banking regulators also shifted their supervisory 
approach towards risk-focused banking supervision, reinforcing the importance of sound 
risk management in banking.   
In connection with promoting market forces and measuring risk, initiatives have 
led to greater use of current (market) valuations, both for internal use by large depository 
institutions and in capital regulations.  However, full market-value accounting has not 
had broad support in the private sector or by policymakers.  Rather, in banking the 
emphasis has been on initiatives for reporting information that can be used to assess risk 
exposures and, thus, indirectly get at current valuations.  
Among the recommendations in the Report that were not adopted are those 
stipulating certain features of subordinated debt used for regulatory purposes.  Regarding 
other recommendations in the Report, the one for pricing deposit insurance based on the 
consolidated risk of the banking enterprise does not seem to have received much 
attention.  Furthermore, contrary to the Report’s recommendation, the deposit insurance 
coverage for retirement account has been raised substantially, and the coverage for other 
deposits could begin to rise with the rate of inflation after 2010. 
  The recommendations for supervisory reforms have gotten only limited traction.  
While several developments are consistent with the Report’s recommendations, such as 
using off-site monitoring and early warning system, the supervisory agencies have not 
been restructured along the lines suggested by the Report.  Prudential regulation and 
deposit insurance administration have not been fully linked.  While the Federal Reserve 
revised the Discount Window programs by raising the discount rate above the market 
rate, it remains the lenders of last resort and continues to supervise state member banks 
and bank holding companies.  Indeed, as the umbrella supervisor of financial holding 
companies, the Federal Reserve’s supervisory role has expanded in some dimensions. 
  Overall, public policy and private sector initiatives appear to have contributed to 
safer and sounder banking and thrift sectors over the past 20 years.  Consistent with what 
we see as the main theme of the Report, a likely contributing factor is the more 
appropriate alignment of incentive for risk-taking among larger depository institutions.    35
Developments affecting risk-taking by depository institutions likely include higher 
capitalizations, greater risk exposure of private sector stakeholders more generally, 
improvements in risk management, and supervision and regulation that is focused on 
overall risk.        36
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